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Legal writing is full of phrases we use often without always thinking about their weight. If you’ve ever spent time drafting pleadings, you’ve probably used (or at least seen) the phrase “on information and belief.” It sounds harmless enough, even lawyerly, but the more you dig into it, the more questions arise. When is it appropriate to use? What does it really mean? Are courts really ok with lawyers using it, especially after Twombly and Iqbal raised the pleading bar? [1] It’s worth revisiting what this phrase does—and doesn’t—accomplish.

At its core, pleading “upon information and belief” signals that the party making the allegations lacks direct, personal knowledge of the fact but has a reasonable basis to believe it is true based on other available information. It’s meant to strike a balance between avoiding perjury and allowing access to the courts when certain facts are likely in the possession of the opposing party. That’s why it’s particularly common in early-stage litigation, where discovery has not yet occurred, and plaintiffs are not expected to have access to all the key evidence.

A Short History (And Why it Still Matters)

The phrase has been around for centuries. Black’s Law Dictionary defines it simply: “A phrase used to indicate that a statement is not based on firsthand knowledge but on secondhand information that the declarant believes to be true.”[2] Traditionally, courts tolerated using “on information and belief” where facts were “peculiarly within the possession and control of the defendant.”[3]

Before Twombly and Iqbal, federal complaints operated under the more forgiving standard of Conley v. Gibson: a complaint wouldn’t be dismissed “unless it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim.”[4] That gave lawyers a long leash to plead lean and fill in the details during discovery.

Then Twombly happened, and the leash got a lot shorter. In Twombly,the Court rejected a barebones antitrust conspiracy allegation that lacked any factual support beyond parallel conduct. Under the new standard, complaints were now required to include “facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”[5] That phrase changed everything because now plaintiffs who failed to “nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible” would see their action dismissed.

Two years later in Iqbal the Court made clear that Twombly’s holding was not limited to antitrust cases and applied to all civil cases in federal court. Iqbalalso confirmed and emphasized that courts should disregard conclusory statements and only accept well-pleaded allegations as true.[6] That meant plaintiffs had to plead enough specific, non-conclusory facts to make their claims plausible, not just possible.

So what does this have to do with “information and belief”?

The New Reality: “Information and Belief” Isn’t a Free Pass

Under the Conley standard, alleging something “on information and belief” was often good enough, especially before discovery. You didn’t need to prove your claims at all, you just had to raise them. But following Twombly and Iqbal, courts now scrutinize whether those “information and belief” allegations actually contain factual substance or are just artful legal conclusions in disguise.

It’s not that pleading “on information and belief” is now forbidden. Far from it. Courts still allow it, especially when the facts are within the defendant’s exclusive knowledge.[7] Thus, courts are more willing to allow pleading “on information and belief” for allegations related to intent, knowledge, and control, which are inherently difficult to plead with precision before discovery.[8]  In certain types of cases, however, courts are far more stringent about its use. With respect to pleading claims requiring particularity, courts demand even more specificity and mere “information and belief” language is often insufficient unless accompanied by factual support.[9]

Any assertion made upon “information and belief” must still be backed by a reasonable factual basis that is ascertainable on the face of the pleading.[10]

For example, if you plead “on information and belief, the defendant was aware of the fraud,” that’s likely to get tossed unless you explain how you know, or why it’s reasonable to infer that knowledge from the surrounding facts. Iqbal specifically says courts should ignore conclusory statements, even if framed as beliefs or suspicions.

That means lawyers can’t rely on the phrase like a shield. Lawyers should use “on information and belief” when necessary, but tether it to something concrete. The bottom line is: Twombly and Iqbal dramatically changed the pleading landscape. “On information and belief” still has its place, but lawyers can’t just toss it in and hope the court will let it slide into discovery. When pleading “on information and belief,” make sure you’ve got more than just a hunch.

About the Author

Alice LaCour, Partner

Alice is an experienced litigator with extensive courtroom experience from nearly a decade of litigating cases for the U.S. Department of Justice. Follow her on LinkedIn here.

[1] Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding that to survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (explaining that “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct” the pleader has not shown they are entitled to relief).

[2] Information and Belief, on, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

[3] Arista Records LLC. v. Doe, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010); see also McDermott v. Clondalkin Grp., Inc., 649 F. App’x 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding same); Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 442–43 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding same); Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2008) (highlighting the appropriateness of pleading on the basis of information and belief where matters that are necessary to complete the statement of a claim are not within plaintiff’s knowledge).

[4] Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957).

[5] Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

[6] Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

[7] See, e.g., Ahern Rentals, Inc. v. EquipmentShare.com, Inc., 59 F.4th 948, 953 (8th Cir. 2023) (reiterating that pleading on information and belief is “expressly contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” and “must be permitted in at least some circumstances”).

[8] See, e.g., Innova Hosp. San Antonio L.P. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 892 F.3d 719, 730 (5th Cir. 2018) (allowing an ERISA case to proceed on information and belief that failed to cite plan language in the complaint because ERISA cases often require pleading facts “‘which tend systemically to be in the sole possession of defendants’” (quoting Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 598 (8th Cir. 2009)); Dedrick v. Abilene Motor Express, Inc., No. 1:21-CV-0027, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215573, at *16 (W.D. Va. Nov. 8, 2021) (“In general, discriminatory intent is information that is peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge and control.”).

[9] See, e.g., United States ex rel. Grenadyor v. Ukrainian Vill. Pharmacy, Inc., 772 F.3d 1102, 1108 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that the “familiar formula [of information and belief] won’t do in a fraud case—for it can mean as little as ‘on rumor’ unless (1) the facts constituting the fraud aren’t accessible to the plaintiff and (2) the plaintiff provides ‘the grounds for his suspicions’” (quoting Pirelli Armstrong v. Walgreen, 631 F.3d at 443)).

[10] See id.; Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting a claim for inequitable conduct where plaintiff plead on “information and belief” but provided “neither the ‘information’ on which it relie[d] nor any plausible reasons for its ‘belief’” because pleading “on information and belief” is only permissible if “the pleading sets for the specific facts upon which the belief is reasonably based”); Tuchman v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994) (“If the facts pleaded in a complaint are peculiarly within the opposing party’s knowledge, fraud pleadings may be based on information and belief. However, this luxury must not be mistaken for license to base claims of fraud on speculation and conclusory allegations.” (citation omitted)).